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ABSTRACT. It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a
decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides
to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that ﬁgures in Kavka’s
toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the
principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has
been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to
intend as commanded. Here it is argued that ordinary agents in ordinary
cases can have justifying reasons for deciding that are not and will not be
justifying reasons for doing what, in making those decisions, they come to
intend to do. The paper concludes with some brief observations on the
functions of decision-making.
When one makes a decision, one actively forms an intention
to perform an action of a certain type. Some decisions are
decisions to do something in particular at some nonimmedi-
ate future time; we may call these future-directed decisions.
Others -- present-directed decisions -- are decisions to do
something right away. In either case, the decision is itself an
action, a basic intentional action of intention-formation.1
One generally has reasons for the decisions that one makes
as well as for intending as one comes to intend when one
makes a decision. And one generally makes decisions and
thus comes to intend for reasons.
Typically, reasons that one has for deciding to A, and rea-
sons one has for intending to A, are reasons one has for A-ing.
And the reasons for which one makes a decision are, likewise,
typically reasons that one has to perform the action that one
thereby comes to intend to perform. When I decide to take my
car to the repair shop, the reasons that I have for so deciding,
and the reasons for which I make this decision, are typically
the reasons that I have to take my car to the shop.
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Of course, one sometimes has a reason to make a decision
on a certain matter at or by a certain time, where those rea-
sons are not reasons favoring any speciﬁc decision on that
matter over any alternative. I might ﬁnd myself distracted by
the question whether to attend a meeting this afternoon and
want to settle the matter now so that I can get it out of my
mind and focus on my work. This kind of reason for making
a decision is not a reason to do what I decide to do. But it
also need not be a reason favoring any speciﬁc decision on
this matter. It is with reasons of this latter kind that I am
henceforth concerned here.2
It is a widespread view that the reasons an agent has for
deciding -- and for intending -- are, in every case, identical
with the reasons the agent has for doing what, in making the
decision in question and so coming to intend, she intends (or
would intend) to do. Elizabeth Anscombe apparently en-
dorses this view when she asserts that ‘‘grounds of intention
are only reasons for acting’’ (1963, p. 90). Similarly, Donald
Davidson maintains that
the reasons an agent has for intending to do something are basically of
the same sort as the reasons an agent has for acting intentionally: they
consist of both desires (and other pro-attitudes) and beliefs. If someone
intends to polish his right shoe, it must be because there is some value he
wants to promote by polishing his right shoe (perhaps he has already
shined his left shoe and he wants the two to match), and he believes that
by shining his right shoe he has a chance of promoting what he wants
(1985, pp. 213–214).3
Berent Enc¸ argues in his recent book on action that ‘‘the rea-
sons an agent has for an action are the same as the reasons
she has for willing, deciding, or intending to perform that ac-
tion’’ (2003, p. 32).4 And Stewart Goetz defends the thesis
that ‘‘an agent’s justiﬁcation at any time t for then deciding
to do action A (or deciding not to do A) later is identical
with his justiﬁcation at t for doing A (or not doing A) later’’
(1998, p. 206).5
Thomas Pink has rejected this view about the relation of
reasons for deciding or intending and reasons for doing what
one intends. He distinguishes between the psychological states
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-- he calls them reasons -- that motivate one to decide or
otherwise act and what justiﬁes deciding or otherwise acting.
Although one’s reasons for deciding (and thus coming to in-
tend) are generally the very same psychological states that
motivate one to perform the intended action, there are, Pink
argues, cases where this is not so.6 And one’s justiﬁcation for
deciding (and thus coming to intend), he maintains, is never
the same as one’s justiﬁcation for doing what, in making the
decision in question, one comes to intend to do (1991; 1993;
1996, ch. 8; 1998).
As Pink sees it, ‘‘agency is justiﬁed in terms of the likeli-
hood of its furthering desirable ends’’ (1996, p. 137).7 What
would justify some action A would be the likelihood that A-
ing would further some desirable end. But since making a
decision to A is itself performing an action, deciding to A is
justiﬁed by the likelihood that so deciding will promote some
desirable end (1993; 1996, p. 145).
Pink nevertheless argues that justiﬁcations for deciding are
subject to the following restriction: ‘‘any end E that justiﬁes
deciding to do A must, supposing that decision is taken, also
provide at least as much justiﬁcation for doing A’’ (1996, p.
153; cf. Owens, 2000, pp. 81–82). Decision-making, he holds,
serves to apply practical reason to subsequent action. ‘‘The
whole point of taking decisions about which actions we shall
perform. . .is to ensure that we end up performing the right
actions’’ (Pink, 1996, p. 179).8 Decisions to act must then be
motivation-perpetuating and rationality-preserving: rationally
deciding to A must dispose one to A rationally thereafter
(1996, p. 111–118). As he puts it, ‘‘the rationality of deciding
to do A guarantees the rationality of doing A thereafter’’
(1996, p. 93), provided that there is no new relevant informa-
tion.9 The rationality of deciding on a course of action could
not provide this guarantee, he maintains, if the restriction on
justiﬁcations for deciding did not hold (1996, p. 153).10
Pink regards an action as rational just in case it is ‘‘moti-
vated by desires for ends which, through their desirability,
also sufﬁciently justify the action’’ (1996, p. 140). Along these
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lines, one might say that a justifying reason for performing a
certain action is a desire for an end that is likely to be fur-
thered by that action and which, through its desirability, pro-
vides some degree of justiﬁcation for performing that action.
Then, despite Pink’s rejection of the widespread view about
reasons for deciding, he apparently agrees with those who
hold that view on the following restrictive thesis: any justify-
ing reason for deciding must be, once the decision is made, a
justifying reason for doing what one, in making that decision,
comes to intend to do.11 Indeed, since he maintains that all
intentions are actively formed in decision-making, Pink seems
committed, as are holders of the widespread view, to the fol-
lowing, more comprehensive, restrictive thesis:
(R) any justifying reason for deciding to A, and any justifying reason for
coming to intend to A, must be, once the decision is made or the inten-
tion acquired, a justifying reason for A-ing.
Insofar as they recognize any practical reasons as justifying
reasons, the several writers I have identiﬁed all appear to be
committed to R. I argue here that this restrictive thesis is mis-
taken. An agent can have a justifying reason for making a
certain decision, or for acquiring a certain intention, that is
not and will not be a justifying reason to do any of what the
agent thereby comes (or would come) to intend to do.
My argument against R takes desires (of a certain sort) to
be justifying reasons. This is the view of justifying reasons
that is suggested by Pink. There is, of course, a wide variety
of competing views about what justifying (or normative)
practical reasons are. I do not mean to commit myself here to
any particular view on this matter. I have framed the discus-
sion in terms of Pink’s view for the following reasons: he has
set out the most qualiﬁed version of the restrictive thesis
against which I am arguing; he has oﬀered a rather extensive
discussion of the issues surrounding this thesis; and, conse-
quently, I want to make it clear that my argument applies to
the thesis understood in terms of his conception of justifying
reasons.
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But it should be evident, as I proceed, that the cogency of
the argument does not depend on this particular view of
justifying reasons. A key element of my argument is the pre-
sentation of certain examples (or situations, or cases); and
these should convince proponents of any of several widely
held views of justifying reasons that R is mistaken. The argu-
ment should be acceptable to those who take justifying rea-
sons to be mental states of certain types, or rational mental
states of those types, or the contents of such states, or states
of aﬀairs, or aspects of situations.12
I shall close the paper with a brief comparison of my case
against R with those of some other writers who at least
implicitly reject it, and with a few observations on the point
of deciding.
1. PRIZES AND COMMANDS
Defenders of thesis R – at least those holding standard views
of justifying reasons for actions that carry out prior inten-
tions – must take a certain stand on Gregory Kavka’s (1983)
toxin puzzle. Imagine that an eccentric billionaire oﬀers you a
million dollars for intending by midnight tonight to drink a
toxin tomorrow afternoon. The toxin will make you painfully
ill for a day but will have no lasting harmful eﬀects. If you
have the indicated intention by midnight – the billionaire will
be able to tell whether you do – the prize will be awarded
tomorrow morning, and it will then be yours whether or not
you subsequently drink the toxin. The puzzle concerns whe-
ther it would be rational to acquire the intention in question
and, indeed, whether you would be able to do so.13
Given the alleged restriction on justifying reasons for
intending, your desire to win the prize is a justifying reason
for you to come to intend to drink the toxin only if (once
you so intend) it is also a justifying reason for you to drink
the toxin. But since, if you have the intention by midnight,
the prize will already have been awarded before the time for
drinking the toxin arrives, your desire to win the prize is not
and will not be a justifying reason for you to drink the toxin.
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Defenders of restriction R typically hold, then, that your de-
sire to win the prize is not a justifying reason for you to
intend – or to acquire the intention – to drink the toxin. And
more broadly, they tend to hold that desires for prizes oﬀered
for intending – prizes that can be won regardless of whether
one does what one intends – are never justifying reasons for
intending. (See Pink, 1996, pp. 147–159; Owens, 2000, pp. 81–
82; Enc¸, 2003, pp. 33–34).14
In defending the alleged restriction, Pink (1996, pp. 154–
155) also rules out the justiﬁcation-giving status of any
command to decide or intend to perform a certain action. A
command such as ‘‘Decide to raise your arm’’ or ‘‘Intend to
raise your arm,’’ he maintains, makes no sense.15 It cannot
provide you with a justiﬁcation for making that decision or
acquiring that intention. This is so, he holds, because a deci-
sion or intention command cannot, once the command is
obeyed, justify performing the action that, in obeying the
command, one comes to intend to perform.
Prizes for deciding or intending can justify so deciding or
intending; desires to win such prizes can be justifying reasons
for so deciding and intending. And a command to decide or
intend can make sense; it can provide one with a justiﬁcation
for doing what one is commanded to do.
2. WINNING A DECISION PRIZE
Suppose that Beta offers you a prize of a million dollars for
doing tomorrow at noon whichever of A-ing or refraining
from A-ing that you decide today to do then. Apart from the
prize oﬀer, neither A-ing tomorrow nor refraining from A-ing
tomorrow is either especially promising or especially onerous.
(A-ing might be something like raising your arm.) Alpha now
oﬀers you a prize of the same amount for deciding today to
A tomorrow at noon. If there are no other relevant consider-
ations, you should be able to win both prizes.
Since you have ordinary desires concerning million-dollar
prizes, Beta’s offer gives you a justifying reason to make
some decision today with respect to A-ing tomorrow at noon
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and then to carry out that decision. You can win Beta’s prize
by deciding today to A tomorrow at noon and then A-ing
tomorrow at noon. Or you can win Beta’s prize by deciding
today to refrain from A-ing tomorrow at noon and then
refraining from A-ing tomorrow at noon. Alpha’s oﬀer gives
you a justifying reason to start on the ﬁrst route to winning
Beta’s prize, for by taking that route you will win twice as
much. With no other relevant considerations in the mix, it
would be foolish – irrational – of you not to take advantage
of the oﬀers and win both prizes.
Alpha’s offer gives you no justifying reason to A tomorrow
at noon, since, if you decide today to A tomorrow at noon,
Alpha’s prize will be awarded whether or not you A tomor-
row. But if you decide today to A tomorrow at noon, then
you will have a strong justifying reason to A tomorrow – viz.,
your desire to win Beta’s prize. Your desire to win Alpha’s
prize is a justifying reason for you to decide today to A
tomorrow at noon, it is a justifying reason for making this
decision that is not and will not be a justifying reason for
A-ing tomorrow, and you can make the decision (in part) for
this reason.
Suppose that a few days ago your friend Charles received a
similar pair of offers from Alpha and Beta. Charles won Be-
ta’s prize by deciding to refrain from A-ing and then subse-
quently so refraining. Curious, you ask him why he did not
decide to A and subsequently A. Did he not see gaining the
additional million dollars as a desirable end? ‘‘Sure,’’ he re-
plies, but he did not see that the likelihood that deciding to A
would promote that end justiﬁed so deciding. As he sees it, it
was a rationally indiﬀerent matter which route he took to
winning the prize oﬀered by Beta. He ﬂipped a coin. Charles
is a strange fellow – and a million dollars poorer than he
ought to be.
Consider the objection that it is not Alpha’s offer, but ra-
ther the combination of Alpha’s and Beta’s offers, that pro-
vides the justiﬁcation for deciding to A. It is not the
likelihood that deciding to A would win you a million dollars
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that justiﬁes your so deciding; it is the likelihood that decid-
ing today to A and then A-ing tomorrow at noon would win
you two million dollars that provides the justiﬁcation. And
the desirable end here will be achieved only if you do tomor-
row what you decide today to do tomorrow. The only justify-
ing reason you have for deciding today to A tomorrow, then,
will be, once you so decide, a justifying reason to do what
you have thereby come to intend to do.
Undoubtedly, the combination of offers provides a justiﬁ-
cation for your deciding to A. But it favors your so deciding
only because Alpha’s oﬀer provides a justiﬁcation for that
decision. Beta’s oﬀer does not itself favor your deciding to A.
The combination does. The combination would not favor
your deciding to A if Alpha’s oﬀer did not provide a justiﬁca-
tion for your so deciding.
3. GETTING BACK TO WORK
Few of us are so lucky as to be presented with a pair of prize
offers like those from Alpha and Beta. But it is not so
extraordinary to be in a situation with an analogous structure
of practical reasons.
Suppose that Ann is distracted by the question whether to
attend a meeting this afternoon. She wants to settle the mat-
ter now so that she can get her mind off it and get some
work done. She ﬁnds it unpleasant to attend meetings of the
sort that is planned, but she is highly curious about who will
say what at this one. As she sees the matter (and we may
suppose she is right about this), she does not have better rea-
son favoring either alternative. But she expects that if she de-
cides now to go to the meeting, that decision will effectively
put the matter out of her mind, allowing her to get something
done in the time between now and the meeting, whereas if
she decides not to attend the meeting, she might well be dis-
tracted throughout the day with thoughts about what she will
miss at the meeting. Ann decides to attend the meeting. One
justiﬁcation that she has for so deciding is that the decision is
more likely than the alternative to further the end of getting
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some work done prior to the time of the meeting. But even
when Ann has so decided, this end is certainly not something
that will be furthered by doing what, in making this decision,
she has come to intend to do -- viz., attend the meeting. Since
Ann desires this end, she has a justifying reason for deciding
to attend the meeting that is not and will not be a justifying
reason for attending the meeting.
Note that in making this decision, Ann does not come to
intend to get some work done in the time prior to the meet-
ing. She has had that intention all along; there has been no
uncertainty in her mind about what to do between now and
meeting time. Thus, the end of getting back to work, while
something that will be furthered by Ann’s decision, is not an
end that will be furthered by doing anything that Ann, in
making this decision, comes to intend to do.
In arguing against the view that justiﬁcations for deciding
to A are identical with justiﬁcations for A-ing, Pink appeals
to the role that future-directed decisions play in coordinating
one’s behavior over time. In most cases, the coordinating
function of future-directed decisions justiﬁes one in making
some decision or other on a certain matter, without justifying
any speciﬁc decision on that matter. But in some cases, the
goal of coordinating one’s behavior over time justiﬁes a spe-
ciﬁc decision without, until that decision is made, providing
any justiﬁcation for the action decided upon. In a case of this
sort, one will have, at some time t, a justiﬁcation for making
a certain decision that is not, at t, a justiﬁcation for doing
what one would thereby decide to do.
Pink imagines a stuntman, Dan, who must decide now
whether to attempt a certain stunt in six months. Dan very
much wants to avoid attempting the stunt without ﬁrst hav-
ing publicized it, and he wants as well to avoid not attempt-
ing the stunt having publicized it. At present, due to a recent
mishap, Dan is risk-averse and so disinclined to attempt the
stunt. But he realizes that as time passes, his risk aversion
will wear off. There is a signiﬁcant possibility that, even if he
now decides not to attempt the stunt, when the time comes,
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he will attempt it. In contrast, he is sure that if he now de-
cides to attempt the stunt, he will do so. Wanting to avoid a
mismatch between prior publicity and subsequent action, and
realizing that his decision will determine whether he
publicizes the stunt, Dan decides to make the attempt. The
end of avoiding a mismatch is more likely to be furthered by
-- and so justiﬁes -- this decision. But until he makes the de-
cision, that end is no more likely to be furthered by Dan’s
attempting the stunt than it is likely to be furthered by his
not attempting the stunt (1991, pp. 351--353; 1993, pp. 330--
331; 1996, pp. 234--236).16
My argument against restrictive thesis R appeals to another
function of future-directed decisions: making such a decision
generally allows one to settle some practical question and
then turn one’s attention elsewhere, devoting limited mental
resources to other matters. In many cases, as I noted earlier,
this function of decision-making provides one with a justiﬁca-
tion for making some decision or other on a certain matter
without justifying any speciﬁc decision on that matter. But in
some cases, the goal of settling some practical matter so that
one can turn one’s attention elsewhere justiﬁes one’s deciding
that matter in a speciﬁc way, without ever justifying one’s do-
ing what one thereby decides to do. Ann’s case is one of this
sort.
4. OBEYING A DECISION COMMAND
A brain researcher seeking to observe the neural realization
of your intention to raise your arm might prompt the inten-
tion simply by telling you to raise your arm. When you inten-
tionally raise the arm, you will have intended to do so.
A command of this sort makes perfect sense. But, of
course, it is not a command to decide or intend.
Suppose now that the researcher wants to see whether
there is a difference in neural realization between present-di-
rected and future-directed intentions. She tells you to decide
now to raise your arm tomorrow at noon. As luck would
have it, Beta had earlier offered you a million dollars for
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doing tomorrow at noon whichever of raising your arm or
refraining from raising your arm that you decide today to do
then. You had your stint as research subject coming up, so
you put off making the decision. Now it strikes you that you
can both win the prize and give the researcher what she
wants. You decide to raise your arm tomorrow.
If you have a general justiﬁcation for complying with the
researcher’s commands, and if you rationally desire to do so,
then it is not a rationally indifferent matter which route you
take to winning Beta’s prize. The rational thing for you to do
is to win it by deciding now to raise your arm tomorrow at
noon and then doing so. Your making that decision is ratio-
nally favored because only your so deciding will further the
desired end of complying with the command. The likely fur-
therance of that end justiﬁes your deciding to raise your arm
but will not, even after your decision is made, justify your
raising your arm tomorrow. Given your desire to cooperate
with the researcher, you have a justifying reason to decide
now to raise your arm tomorrow at noon, one that is not and
will not be a justifying reason to raise your arm tomorrow.
5. SOME OTHER REJECTIONS OF R
I have argued that restriction R is mistaken. I am not the
ﬁrst to advance the view that one can have independent justi-
fying reasons for intending and deciding – justifying reasons
that are not and will not be justifying reasons for doing what
one thereby intends (or would intend) to do. My case against
R is, however, diﬀerent in some important ways from others
that have been advanced.
For one, in the examples presented here as undermining R, it
is rational for the agent to do what she intends to do, and she
has adequate justiﬁcation for doing so, even though she has
some further justiﬁcation for intending that is not and will not
be justiﬁcation for doing what is intended. These features
should make these cases less controversial – and should make
them more eﬀective in undermining R – than are some other
cases that have been thought to count against such a thesis.
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For example, Kavka (1978 [1987]) argues that, in certain
narrowly characterized situations, an agent would be justiﬁed
(by the end of deterrence) in forming the conditional
intention to retaliate if she is herself subjected to a ﬁrst-strike,
even though she would not be justiﬁed (and she knows she
would not be justiﬁed) in carrying out the intended retalia-
tory attack. (Implicitly rejecting R, he takes the likely further-
ance of the end of deterrence to provide the agent with
justiﬁcation for forming the intention to retaliate if attacked,
even though carrying out that intention will not further that
end.)17 Kavka (1984) judges that it would be rational for the
agent to form the intention but not rational for her to carry
it out. David Lewis (1984) concurs with these assessments.
Defenders of R often respond with a denial that the ratio-
nality of forming an intention and the rationality of carrying
it out can come apart in this way, or that ‘‘there could ever
be suﬃcient justiﬁcation for forming an intention to act
which, thereafter, there is no justiﬁcation for executing’’
(Pink, 1996, p. 177, note 3). No such denial is relevant to the
cases I present here, since in these cases, the agents have am-
ple justiﬁcation for doing what they come to intend to do,
and it is quite rational for them to do so.18
Second, it is at best doubtful that, in the kind of deterrence
case presented by Kavka, a rational agent can form the inten-
tion in question – doubtful, at least, that a rational agent can
do this without ﬁrst changing or expecting to change in cer-
tain ways. (Of course, the same doubt arises with regard to
the toxin case.) For the agent fully believes that she will have
overwhelming reason not to carry out the intention, and
(assuming that she expects to remain rational and to retain
this assessment of her reasons) she will thus believe that she
will not carry it out even if the circumstances for doing so (a
ﬁrst-strike) arise. Arguably, she cannot both intend to retali-
ate if attacked and believe that she will not do so. In con-
trast, rational agents in the cases I have presented should be
able to form the intentions in question.
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Alfred Mele (1995) rejects R in discussing a case, similar to
one of mine, in which an agent is presented with two oﬀers
of prizes for intending from two eccentric billionaires. (The
oﬀers diﬀer from those presented to the agent in my case.)
Like my case, Mele’s is of a sort that no one is ever likely
really to be in. However, my case involving Ann’s decision
about whether to attend the afternoon meeting shows that
there are quite ordinary cases with a similar structure of justi-
fying reasons.19
6. THE FUNCTIONS OF DECISION-MAKING
Sensible decision commands, though possible, are not com-
mon. But prizes speciﬁcally for deciding -- in a broad sense
that includes a decision’s likely furtherance of a desirable end
that will not be furthered by the agent’s doing what, in mak-
ing that decision, she would come to intend to do -- decision
prizes of this sort may not be so rare. Such prizes can justify
decisions. Ordinary agents in rather ordinary cases sometimes
have justiﬁcations for deciding that are not and will not be
justiﬁcations for doing any of what, in making the decisions
in question, they come (or would come) to intend to do.
Given desires for such prizes, these agents have justifying rea-
sons for deciding that are not and will not be justifying reasons
for doing what they thereby intend (or would intend) to do.
Does this conclusion imply that decision-making does not
serve to apply practical reason to subsequent action? It im-
plies, at least, that deciding can serve some purpose distinct
from this one.
Deciding is, essentially, actively coming to be committed to
or settled on performing a certain action. Being so committed
is being disposed to do what one is committed to do. Typi-
cally, at least part of one’s point in committing oneself to
some speciﬁc course of action is ensuring that one will, in do-
ing what one decides to do, do what one has best, or better,
or good enough, reason to do. Deciding, then, typically ap-
plies practical reason to one’s subsequent behavior. But mak-
ing a decision sometimes has some other point as well.
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An intention to perform a certain action at a later time
might, as Kavka observes, ‘‘produce effects independent of its
actually being carried out’’ (1984, p. 155). In some cases, the
production of such effects may be at least part of the agent’s
point in forming the intention. Ann’s case, in which deciding
to attend the meeting has the effect of enabling her to get
back to work, is one illustration of this phenomenon.
If by the function of deciding we mean the purpose for
which the capacity to make decisions was favored by natural
selection, then it seems likely that deciding has no single
function. But Pink apparently takes the function of decision-
making to concern what legitimate point an agent may have
in making a decision, or what can justify deciding. To this
question, too, we should expect a pluralist answer. Ends that
can justify acting as decided play the lead role. But we do not
have a one-man show.20
NOTES
1 On decisions as basic intentional actions, see, for example, Mele (1997,
2000) and Pink (1996). Not all intentions are actively formed in decision-
making. One makes a decision only when there is some question in one’s
mind about what to do. But there is no such question in some cases of
intentional action. With routine or habitual actions – such as opening the
door to one’s car – the intention that one executes in acting may be non-
actively acquired, arising from one’s beliefs and desires without one’s hav-
ing actively to form it. On this point, see Audi (1973, pp. 394–395),
Bishop (1989, pp. 181–182), and Mele (1992b, p. 141).
2 Bratman (1987, p. 103) and Pink (1991, p. 350) similarly distinguish be-
tween reasons for making some decision or other on a certain matter and
reasons for deciding the matter a certain way.
3 The Anscombe and Davidson passages are cited by Pink (1991, pp.
344–345).
4 In arguing for this view, Enc¸ (2003, pp. 30–37) aims to cast doubt on
volitional theories of intentional action, views according to which (i) every
intentional action either is or begins with a basic mental action such as a
decision, a volition, or an act of will, and on which (ii) these basic mental
actions cannot be analyzed in terms of event causation. While I argue
here against Enc¸’s view about reasons for deciding and intending, my con-
clusions provide no support for either (i) or (ii).
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5 Farrell (1989, p. 287) may also endorse this view when he asserts that
‘‘an ideally rational individual would commit herself to future action on
the basis of her estimates of how reasonable the relevant actions will be at
the time of action rather than on the basis of her estimates of the utility
to her, at the time of forming that intention, of its being the case that she
intends to perform those actions.’’
Pink (1991, p. 344; 1996, pp. 141–142) takes Bratman to hold the wide-
spread view as well. Bratman (1987, p. 103) does maintain that ‘‘what we
deliberate about, when we deliberate about the future, is what to do then.
This means that in such deliberation about the future the desire-belief rea-
sons we are to consider are reasons for various ways we might act later.’’
However, in the discussion in which this claim appears, he seems to allow
that an agent might have reasons for intending that would not be reasons
for doing what is intended. The quoted passage simply asserts that no
such reasons would be considered in deliberation about the future action.
Bratman (1998, pp. 62–63) subsequently allows that reasons of this type
can be considered in deliberating about future actions.
6 In a later section of this paper, I describe the main case employed by
Pink in arguing for this claim.
7 ‘‘By furthering an end I mean something like raising the objective
probability of the end’s attainment. This might be through causing the
end’s attainment – but end furtherance need not involve causation. Doing
A might further end E by helping constitute the attainment of E: attaining
E might, for example, consist simply in A’s being done…. By ’likely’ I
mean what the evidence suggests, or what is epistemically as opposed to
objectively probable’’ (Pink, 1996, p. 139).
8 Pink (1996, pp. 70–71) follows Bratman (1987) in drawing attention to
the ways in which decision-making allows a persisting agent to coordinate
her behavior over time and to the beneﬁts of making decisions in advance,
given our bounded rationality and intellectual resources. Pink sees these
roles as subordinate to the main function of decision-making to ensure
our rational unity through time, a function that he expresses with the
statement quoted in the text here.
9 ‘‘If a decision to act is taken rationally, then, in the absence of new
information which warrants revising the assumptions on which the deci-
sion was based, the action which executes the decision will be rational
too’’ (1996, p. 93).
10 Goetz (1998, p. 205) also appeals to rationality-preservation in arguing
for the stronger thesis that he holds, one that identiﬁes justiﬁcation for
deciding to A with justiﬁcation for A-ing.
11 The restriction would be thought to hold provided that the desire in
question – the justifying reason – survives (or would survive) the making
of the decision. A similar proviso applies to the restriction R that follows
in the text.
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12 My argument against R does assume that one possible view of justify-
ing reasons is incorrect. Let us say that a ‘‘course of action’’ is a decision
and a subsequent action (or series of actions) that carries out that
decision. Some writers (e.g., Gauthier, 1994, 1998a, b) hold that the ratio-
nality of at least some decisions and the actions that carry them out is a
matter not of their individual expected consequences but of the expected
consequences of courses of action comprised of them.
Now, this is a view about the rationality of (at least some) decisions and
decided-upon actions, and not explicitly about justifying reasons. But con-
sider the following further thesis: something is a justifying reason for
deciding to perform a certain action, or for performing a previously
decided-upon action, only insofar as that something is a justifying reason
for engaging in the course of action that includes the decision or subse-
quent action in question. Plainly, given such a view of justifying reasons,
R comes out correct.
Gauthier apparently does not hold this further thesis (see, for example,
his 1998a), nor do some other writers (e.g., Robins, 1997) who advance
similar views of practical rationality. And none of the ﬁgures identiﬁed in
the text here as committed to R endorses it.
13 The billionaire’s oﬀer rules out your providing yourself with external
incentives to drink the toxin, such as by hiring someone to break your legs
if you fail to drink it. Gimmicks such as hiring a hypnotist to implant the
intention or forgetting key facts about the situation are also disallowed.
14 Owens’s claim is stated in terms of justiﬁcation: ‘‘a prize for taking the
decision to consume a toxin will not justify that decision because it will
not justify the action decided upon’’ (2000, pp. 80–81). But with justifying
reasons characterized in the way suggested by Pink, it seems likely that
Owens would accept the claim in the text regarding desires to win decision
prizes.
15 O’Shaughnessy (1980, p. 300) similarly holds that there is no such com-
mand as ‘‘Decide to raise your arm.’’ He takes the alleged nonexistence of
decision commands to show that forming an intention – deciding – is never
an action. I take it for granted that deciding is a basic intentional action.
On this point, I am in agreement with most defenders of the restrictive
thesis.
16 Recall (note 7 above) that the relevant notion of likelihood is episte-
mic. Which action will avoid a mismatch depends on which decision Dan
makes, and we are to imagine that prior to his making the decision, the
available evidence does not settle the question of which decision he is
more likely to make.
17 Similarly, as Kavka sees it, the agent in the toxin case has a reason to
intend to drink the toxin but has no reason to drink it. (Gauthier [see
note 12 above] rejects this last claim; so does McClennen (1990, pp. 227–
231). For replies, see Bratman (1998) and Mele (1996)).
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18 Another feature of Kavka’s deterrence case is that the intention in-
volved is conditional: it is an intention to retaliate if attacked. Moreover,
it is what Kavka calls self-stultifying: if it fulﬁlls the agent’s purpose, ‘‘it
ensures that the intended...act is not performed, by preventing the circum-
stances of performance from arising’’ (1978 [1987], p. 20). As my cases
(and others) plainly show, reasons for rejecting R are not found only in
cases involving intentions of these sorts.
19 Another case of Mele’s (1992a) that, as he sees it, counts against R in-
volves an agent who has a couple of highly unusual features: he is cursed
to drink – either intentionally or unintentionally – any liquid toxin in his
vicinity, and his intentions always persist unless he either actively drops
them or carries them out. My cases, like others of Kavka, Lewis, and
Mele, show that there may be independent justifying reasons for deciding
or intending in cases with quite ordinary agents.
20 I wish to thank Alfred Mele, Thomas Pink, Sarah Wright, and an
anonymous referee for this journal for their generous comments on drafts
of this paper. Versions of the paper were presented at the University of
Georgia, a conference on Action and Agency at the University of Florida
(February 2005), the 2005 Paciﬁc Division Meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, and the 2005 Annual Conference of the Aus-
tralasian Association of Philosophy; I am grateful to audience members
for their comments.
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